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"LIMITED IN SEX, THEY DARE": 
ATTITUDES TOWARD ISSUES OF PATIENT SEXUALITY 
Michael L. Perlin 
The author frequently speaks on issues involving the sexuality rights of 
persons with mental disabilities who are institutionalized. In this article, he 
discusses the prevalent attitudes of audience members to these presenta-
tions-attitudes ranging from anger to denial to projection to transfer-
encelcountertransference to fear to expressions of religiosity. In some cases, 
an important connection is made between the speaker and audience mem-
bers. The article considers these attitudes and seeks to offer explanations for 
why this is such a threatening topic to so many listeners. 
I began practicing mental disability law part-time in 1971 as a public de-
fender in Trenton, New Jersey, and full-time in 1974, when I became director 
of the Division of Mental Health Advocacy of the New Jersey Department of 
the Public Advocate. I represented criminal defendants in insanity defense 
trials, in incompetency-to-stand-trial proceedings, at insanity acquittal reten-
tion hearings, and at post-incompetency-adjudication placement hearings (1). 
Also, I represented civil patients at commitment hearings, in class actions 
involving the right to treatment, the right to refuse treatment, and a variety of 
other civil rights issues (2). It was not until. 1979, however, that I gave any 
serious thought to the question of patient sexuality: to what extent do persons 
institutionalized because of mental disability retain the same rights to sexual 
autonomy that the rest of us enjoy, and, in most cases, take for granted? 
Why would it take eight years to understand such a simple human need? 
Perhaps it was because the other problems my clients faced appeared to be so 
overwhelming (in many cases, literally, of life or death). Perhaps it was be-
cause no client-of the hundreds and hundreds I had represented on an indi-
vidual basis-had ever raised the issue with me, perhaps because at that time 
I had not come to appreciate how the issue of sanism (the virulent prejudice 
faced by persons with mental disabilities, both in institutions and in the 
community) (3) influenced my own and others' thinking about this matter or, 
perhaps, the matter simply never entered my mind. 
Copyright 2005 American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, Volume 26, Issue 3. The Journal is ~ 
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I acknowledge that this may have been the residue, at least in part, of my 
own unconscious or passive prejudices or unwarranted assumptions about 
persons with mental illness. Another reason may be that discussing sexual 
practices is not something that clients and lawyers-or any people who have 
a formal relationship with each other but do not know each other well-do. 
MY FIRST AWARENESS 
My ignorance, though, came to a screeching halt in 1979, and I can 
identify the precise moment when it happened. One of the first major class 
actions that I litigated was a civil rights action to vindicate the rights of in-
stitutionalized patients to participate in voluntary, compensated, therapeutic 
work programs, consonant with the mandates of the federal Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (1, § 14-4, p. 66-74) ( 4, 5). After extensively consulting with both 
our named plaintiffs and other non-named plaintiff class members, John 
Ensminger, my co-counsel (6), and I came to a tentative settlement with law-
yers representing state and county hospitals, but decided that, before we 
would sign the settlement, we needed to determine if this disposition of the 
case met with our clients' approval (7), a determination that places unique 
responsibility on counsel to ascertain that the settlement is "fair, adequate, 
and reasonable" (8). It was not logistically feasible to question each of the 
8,000+ members of the class as to whether they approved of the settlement 
(nor was it required by court rules in cases of so-called "civil rights" class 
actions [9]). We thought, however, that it made sense to poll a sample (albeit, 
perhaps, not a random sample) which we did by meeting with "patient gov-
erning councils" at each of the hospitals in which our clients were housed. 
We did this, and immediately realized that, in terms of the ultimate set-
tlement, this had been a fortuitous decision. Class members, by way of ex-
ample, discussed a range of issues, e.g., payment for incidental work, and the 
relationship between institutional and community work programs, that had 
not received much consideration during the pretrial negotiation process (and 
that were eventually part of the final order). (I am consciously leaving for 
another article any sort of extensive discussion of the specific ethical issues 
that are involved when lawyers representing large classes of persons institu-
tionalized because of mental disability move forward in class action litiga-
tion [on the questions of the role of named plaintiffs, obligations on the law-
yers of seeking out representative samplings of class member attitudes, etc.]). 
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But, something else happened that forever changed the way that I thought 
about psychiatric hospitalization. 
My colleague and I went to Marlboro Psychiatric Hospital (at which 
many of our clients resided) one balmy spring night to meet with the gov-
erning council members. My recollection is that there were about 25-35 in 
the group; the hospital's population at this time was well over 1,000 patients. 
We met on the porch of a sprawling, Victorian building that the hospital used 
for patient activities, and went into our pitch. We explained who we were, 
why we had brought the case, why we were settling rather than going to trial, 
what the settlement entailed, and why we were there for input. As we talked, 
I kept scanning the porch, making eye contact, wondering if there would be 
patients (as there had been at every other facility we had visited) who would 
come up to us at the end of our visit to tell us about other issues, potential 
lawsuits, whatever. 
But, as I was doing this, my attention was arrested by the sight of a 
young couple kissing passionately and fondling each other. The couple was 
most likely in their mid twenties, and both were relatively well-dressed. I 
mention this, because at that time, our clients' wardrobes ranged from state-
issued overalls (in the forensic facility), to horribly mismatched out-of-style 
clothes (that had obviously been dropped off by a local Goodwill-type 
agency, and distributed to patients without thought of size or fashion com-
patibility), to their own brought-from-home clothes. This couple's attire 
clearly_ fell into this last category. They were seated in the middle of a middle 
row and were surrounded on all sides by other patients, who ranged in age 
from 18 to 65 plus. Also, and significantly, neither was beset by the ravages 
of tardive dyskinesia (from which so many patients suffered at that time). I 
mention this because the couple looked "different" than the vast majority of 
our clients, and I still wonder to this day whether my reaction to this scene 
would have been different if this couple had not presented in a physically 
attractive way. 
I tried very hard not to stare, but it was difficult. First, their behavior was 
totally unexpected. Also, as I observed what was going on, I was thunder-
struck by what I instantly realized was something that I had not witnessed, 
and failed to realize that I had not witnessed, in all of the work that I had 
done representing patients in psychiatric hospitals for the past eight years. 
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This was the first time that I saw patients express physical affection for each 
other. I realized that this was a clue to understanding the hidden world of the 
state psychiatric institution. 
At the end of our presentation, I spoke to a patient who, although not a 
named plaintiff, was one of our key client-witnesses, and asked him whether 
he knew the couple. He said that he did, and that their story was well-known 
to many hospital residents: they were from the same home town, knew each 
other in high school, but became a couple only after they were institutional-
ized. He explained that what I saw was "pretty tame," compared to what 
happened occasionally on field trips or during "free time" (the Marlboro 
campus covered many acres with many relatively-out-of-eye-range nooks 
and crannies), but, that he surmised that the couple was on "good behavior," 
because "you guys were lawyers and all." 
I drove home in a half-daze, reflecting on what I had seen that night, and 
everything that I had not seen over the prior eight years. At that time, New 
Jersey's psychiatric hospitals ranged from total maximum security to me-
dium security to open ward. Now so much became clear to me. I recalled 
having clients come to see me in an unused day room or cafeteria or library 
(wherever we could have some privacy for our lawyer-client discussion), 
furtively tucking in shirt tails, arranging blouses, blushing. Now it all made 
sense. I was mortified and chagrined that I had never "gotten it" before, that I 
had never even thought about, let alone realized, what had been going on. 
And certainly, there was no hospital policy addressing the issue of "patient 
sexuality." Indeed, the few policies that existed at that time at other hospitals 
did little more than forbid any sort of interaction ( 10). It had even been sug-
gested elsewhere that "sexual activity between psychiatric inpatients should 
be strictly prohibited, and when it occurs patients should be isolated ... and 
tranquilized if necessary" (11). One hospital's guidelines counseled patients 
as follows: "If you develop a relationship with another patient, staff will get 
together with you to help decide whether this relationship is beneficial or 
detrimental to you ... " (12). 
The next day, when I went to my office, I told some of my colleagues 
what had happened, and I found the responses to be interesting. Some said, 
"Sure, that makes sense," but others said, "Leave it alone!" (reasoning that, if 
we were to raise this issue in public, we might have to weather a firestorm of 
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criticism, especially from conservative legislators, that might threaten our 
agency's existence (The Division of Mental Health Advocacy was a state-
funded office)). Still others said, "Back burner it; we've got too many other 
cases on our docket now." So we decided that we would approach the issue 
quietly; we would ask our "field representatives" (psychologists, social 
workers and psychiatric nurses) to be especially alert for client complaints, 
or even stories that dealt with questions of sexuality on hospital wards. 
After a few weeks, it became clear that inquiry was going to be difficult 
and challenging. Most of our staff reported that there were no complaints; the 
few who had learned of complaints were quickly told that the patient did not 
want to "rock the boat," or "make waves." But all agreed that this was an 
important issue; there was simply no way to raise it. 
After a while, our attention was refocused. Our office was immersed in 
complex right-to-refuse-litigation in Rennie v. Klein. Also, on March 30, 
1981, John Hinckley shot Ronald Reagan, leading me to focus most of my 
attention on averting attempts to abolish the insanity defense in New Jersey 
and in Congress. In 1982, I left the Division of Mental Health Advocacy to 
become Special Counsel to the· New Jersey Public Advocate. At that point, . 
my docket became broader-based, and I spent a substantial amount of time 
on the preparation of amicus briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court on a wide va-
riety of legal issues. Questions of sexual autonomy faded into the back-
ground. 
MY TEACHING 
Two years later, in 1984, I became a professor at New York Law School, 
and assumed directorship of the law school's Federal Litigation Clinic, su-
pervising a caseload of social security/federal benefits cases on behalf of per-
sons with physical and mental disabilities. I also began to teach mental health 
law, and regularly assigned to students to read (for the first day of class) Su-
san Sheehan's magnificent book, Is There No Place on Earth For Me?, the 
story of "Sylvia Frumkin," a brilliant but seriously mentally disabled young 
woman who was a chronic (albeit atypical) patient at Creedmoor State Hos-
pital in New York City (13). Sheehan did not flinch from looking at the issue 
of patient sexuality, noting that hospital staff aides often refused to fill out 
"incident reports" on patient sexual activity because they found the subject 
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matter "so unsavory," and further noting that one of the many "sexual esca-
pades ... [involved] two staff members [who] were injured when they went 
into the men 's bathroom to separate [a patient] and his willing partner" (13, 
p. 92). 
When we discussed the book in class, I would ask students which issues 
they thought were the most important that Sheehan had raised. Invariably, 
the blackboard would fill with 20-30 legal issues, but never did a student 
spontaneously and voluntarily raise the issue of patient sexuality. When I 
mentioned it, I usually got blank stares. Occasionally, a student would add a 
few words about the significance of sexuality to all persons, but all too often, 
the only comment would be something on the level of "Eww, gross!" 
MY WRITING 
During my first six years as a professor, my scholarship mostly pro-
ceeded on two tracks: I completed the first edition of a multi-volume treatise 
on mental disability law (I), and I wrote several law review articles that both 
excoriated the Supreme Court ' s criminal procedure decisions in cases in-
volving defendants with mental disabilities (14-16), and attempted to create a 
unified theory by which we could better understand what I saw as the irra-
tionality of our insanity defense and incompetency-to-strand-trial policies 
(17-19). 
But, in 1990, that changed. After nearly two decades as a practitioner, 
advocate, author and teacher, I had come to realize that there was a deeper 
understructure to mental disability law that could not be understood or con-
fronted simply by reading, analyzing and deconstructing cases and statutes. 
Dr. Morton Birnbaum's perfect term, "sanism," was the key to explaining 
that corrosive and malignant understructure (20, 21, p. 764 n.12). Sanism, I 
came to realize, 
is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as other 
irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing social 
attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnic bigotry. It per-
meates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all participants 
in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact finders , counsel, 
expert and lay witnesses. Its corrosive effects have warped mental 
disability law jurisprudence in involuntary civil commitment law, in-
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stitutional law, tort law, and all aspects of the criminal process (pre-
trial, trial and sentencing) .... Sanist myths exert especially great 
power over lawyers who represent persons with mental disabilities. 
The use of stereotypes, typification, and deindividualization inevita-
bly means that sanist lawyers will trivialize both their client's prob-
lems and the importance of any eventual solution to these problems. 
Sanist lawyers implicitly and explicitly question their clients' com-
petence and credibility, a move that significantly impairs the law-
yers' advocacy efforts (3, p. 684 [footnotes omitted]). 
Elsewhere, I have identified these sanist myths: 
1) Mentally ill individuals are "different" and, perhaps, less than hu-
man. They are erratic, deviant, morally weak, sexually uncontrol-
lable, emotionally unstable, superstitious, lazy, ignorant, and dem-
onstrate a primitive morality. They lack the capacity to show love 
or affection. They smell different from "normal" individuals, and 
are somehow worth less. 
2) Most mentally ill individuals are dangerous and frightening. They 
are invariably more dangerous than non-mentally ill persons, and 
such dangerousness is easily and accurately identified by experts. 
At best, people with mental disabilities are simple and content, like 
children. Either parens patriae or police power supply a rationale 
for the institutionalization of all such individuals. 
3) Mentally ill individuals are presumptively incompetent to partici-
pate in "normal" activities, to make autonomous decisions about 
their lives (especially in areas involving medical care), and to par-
ticipate in the political arena. 
4) If a person in treatment for mental illness declines to take pre-
scribed antipsychotic medication, that decision is an excellent pre-
dictor of future dangerousness and the need for involuntary insti-
tutionalization. 
5) Mental illness can easily be identified by lay persons and matches 
up closely to popular media depictions. It comports with our com-
mon sense notion of crazy behavior. 
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6) It is, and should be, socially acceptable to use pejorative labels to 
describe and single out people who are mentally ill; this singling 
out is not problematic in the way that the use of pejorative labels to 
describe women, blacks, Jews or gays and lesbians might be. 
7) Mentally ill individuals should be segregated in large, distant in-
stitutions because their presence threatens the economic and social 
stability of residential communities. 
8) The mentally disabled person charged with crime is presumptively 
the most dangerous potential offender, as well as the most morally 
repugnant one. The insanity defense is used frequently and im-
properly as a way for such individuals to beat the rap; insanity tests 
are so lenient that virtually any mentally ill offender gets a free 
ticket through which to evade criminal and personal responsibility. 
The insanity defense should be considered only when the mentally 
ill person demonstrates objective evidence of mental illness. 
9) Mentally disabled individuals simply don't try hard enough. They 
give in too easily to their basest instincts, and do not exercise ap-
propriate self restraint. 
10) If "do-gooder," activist attorneys had not meddled in the lives of 
people with mental disabilities, such individuals would be where 
they belong (in institutions), and all of us would be better off. In 
fact, there's no reason for courts to involve themselves in all men-
tal disability cases (3, pp. 724-25 n. 220). 
Once I understood the meaning which Birnbaum had ascribed to sanism, 
much of what I had realized a decade earlier at Marlboro State Hospital 
came, for the first time, into crisp focus. If, as I saw it, sanist myths, based on 
stereotypes, are the result of rigid categorization and overgeneralization, then 
they function psychologically to "localize our anxiety, to prove to ourselves 
that what we fear does not lie within" (22, p. 240). We thus labeled all indi-
viduals with mental illness as being "deviant, morally weak, sexually uncon-
trollable [and] emotionally unstable (3, pp. 393-394). And often, we (espe-
cially professionals) regard them as being fundamentally different from us, 
and lacking human qualities, including needs for affection and dignified 
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ways of expressing affection. Our attitudes toward the sexuality of persons 
with mental disabilities reflect this labeling in this way: 
Society tends to infantilize the sexual urges, desires, and needs 
of the mentally disabled. Alternatively, they are regarded as pos-
sessing an animalistic hypersexuality, which warrants the imposition 
of special protections and limitations on their sexual behavior to stop 
them from acting on these "primitive" urges. By focusing on alleged 
"differentness," we deny their basic humanity and their shared 
physical, emotional, and spiritual needs. By asserting that theirs is a 
primitive morality, we allow ourselves to censor their feelings and 
their actions. By denying their ability to show love and affection, we 
justify this disparate treatment (10, p. 537 [footnotes omitted]). 
Now, it was all starting to make sense. 
MY FIRST (AD)VENTURE 
At about the same time, I began to talk about patient sexuality issues 
with my friend Joel Dvoskin, who was then Associate Commissioner in 
charge of forensic services of the New York State Office of Mental Health. 
We had been discussing the issue of patients' access to condoms at a time · 
when it was generally assumed that condoms would not be made available to 
patients in many forensic hospitals, and that they should actually be treated 
as contraband. Politically, providing or allowing condoms in a state-run fo-
rensic psychiatric facility was likely to be viewed as "condoning" sex among 
patients. This was, Joel said, "a very complicated issue": 
On one hand, many of our patients were quite vulnerable, and 
some had been sexually victimized many times in their lives, as chil-
dren and as adults. Others had long records of predatory sexual be-
havior, within and without correctional environments. I believed that 
I had a duty to protect my vulnerable patients from harm. On the 
other hand, I was well aware of the fact that in any large facility, it 
would be virtually impossible to successfully prevent all forms of 
sexual contacted among the patients. If I were to agree that condoms 
were contraband, it seemed to me that I might be contributing to the 
spread of HIV, which was then presumed to be a fatal disease (23). 
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Further, Joel pointed out to me that there was virtually no legal or psy-
chiatric literature to which he could turn for guidance on such an important 
question, and then suggested I think about the broader issues of patient sexu-
ality more fully (commenting, drily, "Hey Michael, you have tenure now. 
What can they do to you?"), inviting me to give a Grand Rounds presentation 
at Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center on the topic. 
I agreed. I began my research (my research assistant immediately told 
me that some of her classmates offered a variety of snide comments when 
she told them of the assignment...), and I began to write the Grand Rounds 
paper. But, before I did, something remarkable happened at my office, which 
I have since recounted in an article I wrote about how sanism permeates law 
teaching: 
I was sitting at my faculty lunch table, and conversation turned 
to upcoming presentations that we would soon be doing. My col-
leagues mostly take left-liberal positions on a wide variety of issues, 
and are generically the exact mix of retro '60s generationists and 
early baby boomers that you'd expect. They (appropriately) are 
quick to criticize any behavior that is racist, sexist, ethnically bigoted 
or homophobic. Rush Limbaugh would probably view them as one 
of his worst 'politically correct' horror fantasies. I'm not terribly out 
of place in this group. 
When it got to be my turn, I said that I was going to be speaking 
about the right of institutionalized mentally disabled persons to sex-
ual interaction. All conversation came to a screeching halt. 'Michael, 
are you serious?' 'Are you crazy (sic)?' 'Michael, even for you, 
you've gone too far!' 'What are you going to say next: that they can 
get married?!?' Et cetera. 
At this stage of my life and career, few things surprise me. Yet, I 
must admit that I was stunned-not by the response (I spend lots of 
time in places where few people agree with me about anything ... so I 
don't expect, or want, agreement with whatever it is I'm talking 
about), but by the identity and background of the people who were 
uttering these sentiments. As I've said, these were classic New York 
liberals, many of whom had spent much of their distinguished pro-
fessional, academic and personal lives rooting out and exposing 
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prejudiced and stereotypical behavior toward virtually every minor-
ity group one could imagine. The buck, though, stopped there (7, p. 
714). 
With this in mind, I went to Kirby, did the presentation (which lasted 45 
minutes), and then asked, innocently, "Are there any questions?" After 75 
minutes of questioning, the program host pointed out that another meeting 
was scheduled for the room, and we thus had to stop (though there were still 
at least a dozen hands waving). I had clearly tapped a hidden issue that 
screamed out for debate. The audience was composed of forensic mental 
health professionals who worked at Kirby (psychiatrists , psychologists, 
nurses, allied therapists, therapy aides), hospital administrative staff, and a 
few lawyers who frequently represented Kirby patients. 
I returned to my office, and immediately began converting the presenta-
tion into a law review article, one that was subsequently published by the 
NYU Review of Law and Social Change. (10), With the publication of that 
article-and subsequent ones on the same general topic (1 , § 3C-5. l, pp. 
416-421) (24-27)-came one of the most remarkable sets of experiences of 
my professional life. I was asked regularly, and without letup, to make basi-
cally the same presentation before audiences at hospitals, state agencies, pro-
fessional associations, advocacy groups, and law schools across the nation. 
My experiences giving this presentation have been so informative and so 
illuminating, I decided to write this article to share the range of responses 
and attitudes with which I was confronted over the years. 
MYTITLE 
My article title comes from Bob Dylan' s masterpiece, It's Alright Ma 
(I'm Only Bleeding), and is found in this remarkable verse: 
Old lady judges watch people in pairs 
Limited in sex, they dare 
To push fake morals, insult and stare 
While money doesn't talk, it swears 
Obscenity, who really cares 
Propaganda, all is phony (28). 
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I don't think Dylan was thinking about the subject of this article when he 
wrote this song-it is perhaps best known for the lines "But even the presi-
dent of the United States/Sometimes must have/To stand naked" - but noth-
ing could possibly better describe what I am talking about. 
THEIR ATTITUDES 
Had I sought to create a projective test that would reveal my audiences' 
view of sexuality (with all its permutations), I could not have done better 
than to do what I did by taking this talk on the road. Audience members' re-








I will address each of these in turn. 
Anger 
When I gave this talk at the Florida Institute of Mental Health (part of 
the University of South Florida in Tampa), an audience member (from the 
general public) leapt to his feet, and denounced me: "Professor Perlin, you 
are an agent of the devil!" At a New Yark City hospital presentation, a nurse 
folded her arms across her chest, and announced, "Professor, you are the 
very embodiment of evil!" Perhaps these comments were based on religious 
beliefs. I cannot be sure. I experienced similar responses at other hospitals 
and at least one national forensic psychiatry conference. 
I am accustomed to hearing members of my audience disagree with me, 
given the range of topics I choose to speak and write about, but never have I 
experienced the level of vituperation and anger that I have heard time after 
time when I have spoken about this topic. (Well, almost never. A young psy-
chiatrist-perhaps a resident, perhaps an intern-at a private hospital in New 
Jersey once threw a plate of food at me during a luncheon talk I was giving 
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about the right to refuse treatment. This was at some point between 1975-
1979.) 
Denial 
At a Grand Rounds talk at Rochester Psychiatric Hospital, a young psy-
_chologist got up and said, "I don ' t get it. Sex isn't very important anyway. 
What's the big deal?" I questioned her comment, which she delivered very 
matter-of-fact-ly, and she made it clear that she was referring globally to sex 
(and not simply to sexual interaction between patients). I resisted-with 
great difficulty-the urge to respond, "Doctor, get a life." When you lecture 
about sex to mental health professional audiences, you need to focus on self-
control. 
At other presentations, audience members have, time after time, ex-
pressed the view that "These people (sic) have no sense of sexuality; you're 
making a big deal out of nothing." I would estimate that, in 90% of these 
instances, the persons espousing these views have been either psychiatrists 
(almost always older men) or nurses (almost always women) The psychia-
trists either self-identified or were dressed in white coats; the nurses all self-
identified. 
In 2003, I did a site visit at a psychiatric institution in Montevideo, Uru-
guay, and was visiting a ward that, we were told, housed "high-functioning" 
teenage males. Some, in fact, were not mentally ill at all, but were individu-
als with physical disabilities who had been "dumped" at the institution within 
a week of being born, and had been there ever since. 
I asked a staff member about patient sexuality, and was told, "Please! 
There's not one of them interested in sex!" We then walked into the day 
room, where a music video was on the TV (a far more R-rated video that one 
might see on MTV or VH-1), including a scene of two teenage girls kissing 
passionately and deeply. Judging by the expressions on the boys' faces, their 
agitation, and their comments to their ward mates, the staff member could 
not have been more wrong. 
Also, there have been times, when speaking to audiences of American 
psychiatrists, there has not been a single member of the audience who of-
fered a question or comment. As this has never happened to me in the 30 
38 / PERLIN: A mTUDES TOWARD ISSUES OF PATIENT SEXUALITY 
plus years that I have been doing public speaking about the entire range of 
other mental health law topics, I conclude this must be more than chance. 
Projection 
My best story here is one that was shared with me by Debbie Dorfman, a 
frequent co-author, both on questions of patient sexuality (25) and other 
mental disability law topics (29-31). When Debbie practiced law in Santa 
Clara, California, she began a lengthy series of negotiations with the manag-
ers-owners of board and care homes (facilities to which ex-hospital patients 
were deinstitutionalized, but in which they lived involuntarily for months or 
years, much longer than they spent in hospitals, thus suggesting that, if any-
thing, the issue of sexual expression and autonomy would self-evidently be 
even more important in these sites) to establish patient sexuality policies in 
each. She accomplished this at almost all the homes, save for one where the 
owner was adamantly against letting patients have sex. Debbie argued and 
negotiated, and finally , the owner told her, "OK, Ms. Dorfman, you win. Pa-
tients at my facility can have sex on Saturday evenings from 7-8 p.m." Deb-
bie asked, "Why then?" Because, the owner responded, "That's when my 
wife and I do it. If it's good enough for us, it's good enough for them." 
Other examples are important (albeit less memorable). When I spoke 
about this topic at an American Psychiatric Association annual meeting, the 
only comment from the audience was from an APA member who criticized 
the paper for not directly addressing the special issues raised in the cases of 
gay patients. At a talk to a major nationally-based patient advocacy organi-
zation, I was challenged by an audience member who saw "nothing wrong" 
with staff members having sex with patients, accusing me of being sanist in 
arguing for a total ban on such activity. When I questioned him, -he an-
swered, "Well, I can see myself wanting to have sex with a patient. Who are 
you to tell me I can't?" I had no response to his desire, but did as to his pro-
posed plan of action. (I make it clear in my presentation that I believe that 
any hospital sexuality policy should absolutely forbid such relationships.). 
Transference/Countertransference 
I spoke about this topic at a major New York hospital, and thought it 
worthy to note that, at the time, only two law professors showed any interest 
in this topic: myself and Professor Susan Stefan (32, 33). An audience mem-
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ber jumped up, and said, "No, Professor. What's much more interesting is 
why you and Professor Stefan are so obsessed with this topic." (I responded 
to him by reaching my hand into my jacket pocket, pulling out an envelope, 
and saying, "Here's my honorarium. Would you like to do a session now?" 
When I got home and told the story to my wife [a psychotherapist], she said, 
"No, what you should have said is, 'Actually, doctor, the more interesting 
question is why you are so obsessed with what you perceive as my obses-
sion."' She has always thought better on her feet than I do ... ). 
Fear 
Two interrelated fears are expressed almost every time: that sexual free-
dom will lead to an epidemic of pregnancies (and perhaps outbreaks of 
AIDS), and that allowing sexual freedom will lead to a flurry of anti-
institutional litigation. The short answers are I) there is absolutely no em-
pirical evidence that this has happened at any facility that has established 
more liberalized sexual activity policies over the past decade, and 2) that this 
is but one more example of what Stanley Brodsky has brilliantly neologized 
as "litigaphobia": the excessive and irrational fear of litigation" (34-37). 
The reality is that there has been virtually no litigation over this issue at 
all, and that the only important case was litigated more than twenty years ago 
(38). Here, there may be legitimate counterarguments: certainly the fear of 
nonconsensual sex is a rational one; there are no legal guidelines, either 
statutory or caselaw-based, as to determining who is and who is not compe-
tent to consent. But these are both issues that can be addressed by the draft-
ing and implementation of thoughtful policies, not by simply banning all 
sexual interaction. Over a decade ago, by way of example, Clarence Sun-
dram and Paul Stavis wrote a carefully balanced article suggesting guidelines 
in cases involving persons with mental retardation (39), but that article has 
never been cited in any reported litigation. 
Also, the fears of pregnancy and HIV are obviously legitimate ones. 
Ironically, policies that purport to ban all sexual contact (along with a con-
comitant ban on condoms) may well increase the risk of both. But, the fears 
of unfounded and improper litigation on this question have no basis in fact. 
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Religiosity 
I was told by a nurse at a New Jersey state hospital that "God explicitly 
forbids what you are talking about," the nurse adding that he would "pray for 
[my] soul." Many other audience members have invoked religious arguments 
in rejecting my plea that these issues be at least considered thoughtfully. This 
implies that, even if policies are promulgated to protect and promote the 
sexual autonomy of institutionalized individuals, individual line staff at a 
hospital - the people on whom the implementation of any such policy inevi-
tably falls-may simply refuse to cooperate with the policy because their 
own sense of religious "morality" forbids it. Writing about this question ear-
lier, I considered, by way of example, the likelihood that individual staff 
members' religion "may teach that unmarried persons-of any mental ca-
pacity-should not have sex, or that married persons- of any mental capac-
ity-should not have extramarital sex" (10, p. 526-527). I have not yet fig-
ured out the extent to which this attitude triggers the responses I have re-
ceived on this topic. 
Connection 
This response has been very different, and, to my mind, very positive. A 
significant number of audience members often express enthusiasm about my 
presentation, and it is not unusual at all for listeners to come forward and say 
to me, sotto vocce, "I definitely agree with you, but it is impossible to con-
vince anyone at my hospital to change!" As opposed to those whom I de-
scribed earlier, generally, those who respond favorably are psychologists, 
social workers and patient advocates (and, probably, 90% have been female). 
I have also been overwhelmed by the response of audience members 
who identified themselves as persons with disabilities and, speaking from the 
audience for all in attendance to hear, have told moving stories of their at-
tempts to maintain relationships (despite opposition from family members, 
staff, and others), which, in some cases have resulted in marriage and the 
birth of children. Again, as I have previously stressed: "Simply put, the sexu-
ality of persons with mental disabilities is one of the most threatening issues 
confronting clinicians, line workers, administrators, advocates, and attorneys 
who are involved in mental health care related work, as well as the families 
of individuals with mental disabilities" (10, p. 520). 
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I have maintained e-mail relationships with some of these audience 
members and have developed friendships with others. What has been con-
sistent was their relief and gratitude that someone took the issue seriously. 
CONCLUSION 
We all talk about sex every day in every possible way. The sex lives of 
politicians, celebrities, and athletes are a staple of speculation, websites, and 
TV talk shows. But we remain in total denial when confronted with questions 
about the sexuality of persons with mental disabilities, especially those who 
have been institutionalized. As I indicated above, in the twelve years since I 
added this to my research agenda, I have given at least two dozen presenta-
tions to audiences of lawyers, mental health professionals, former patients, 
governmental officials, patient advocates and others. While it is certainly 
true that, during that period of time, state civil hospital censuses have contin-
ued to fall (although that decrease has not been replicated at forensic hospi-
tals), in many states, there are still large numbers of long-term civil patients 
for whom the hospital has become, in effect, their permanent residence. This 
issue, thus, continues to resonate. 
-
When I make these presentations, the responses often perfectly mimic . 
the behavior that Dylan castigates in the line that follows the line that gave 
rise to my title: "To push fake morals, insult and stare" (28). Perhaps if we 
begin to think about these issues in a non-self-referential way (thus avoiding 
the false "ordinary common sense" (40) that has contaminated the social dis-
course), persons residing in psychiatric hospitals finally, again, in Dylan's 
words, will no longer be limited to "thinking of forbidden love" (41). 
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